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Comments
THE RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL DIVIDENDS
IN LOUISIANA
The recovery of illegally paid dividends and other unlawfully
distributed assets from shareholders has become a paramount
consideration in the majority of modem corporation statutes.'
The right of recovery of these illegal dividends is conveniently
1. For the purpose of this comment, all unlawful distributions to share-
holders will be referred to as "illegal dividends." On some occasions unlaw-
ful distribution will take the form of corporate repurchase of shares. In
either event the ultimate effect of such a transaction is to deplete the capital
structure of the corporation upon which the creditors and other sharehold-
ers must rely.
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divided into two categories: rights against the directors of the
corporation and rights against the shareholders.
Illegal dividends are defined by express provision of the
Louisiana Corporation Act. 2 In essence such dividends are those
paid by the corporation when no surplus exists on the corporate
balance sheet. When such dividends are declared and paid, it is
of great interest to the creditors and the ultimate corporate body
to see that these assets are reacquired by the corporation, either
by a suit against the directors or by an action against the share-
holders to recover the funds received by them.
LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS
It is elementary that the directors of a corporation occupy
a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation.3 Thus, liability
attaches if the directors pay illegal dividends when there is no
corporate surplus available for such payment. The early common
law gave the corporation a cause of action against the directors. 4
An early New York case5 clearly enunciated the rule that direc-
tors who declared and paid illegal dividends would be liable in
equity to the creditors.6 The latter rule has been corroborated by
numerous other decisions.7
Statutory provisions now exist in practically all states im-
posing liability on directors for breach of their fiduciary duties,
and in the vast majority of these states the problem of imposing
liability for illegally paid dividends is specially treated.8 How-
ever, these statutes are far from uniform.9 The degree of negli-
gence which is necessary to impose liability on the directors also
2. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 26(I) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106(I)]. The pro-
cedure of surplus accounting is a distinct problem in itself. The derivation
of surplus and its categorization into appropriate surplus accounts are
beyond the scope of this comment. For a complete discussion of these
accounting problems, see Grahm, Accounting in Law Practice (1932) 140,
c. 14.
3. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. (2d)
895,904(1937).
4. McGinnis v. Corporation Funding & Finance Co., 8-F.(2d) 532, 541,
(M. D. Pa. 1925).
5. The Excelsior Petroleum Company v. Lacey, 63 .N.Y. 422(1875).
6. The pith of the action against the directors for declaring and paying
illegal dividends is tort. Consequently, in absence of statute, the statute
of limitations applicable to such action is that generally applicable to tort
action. Fell v. Pitts, 263 Pa. 314, 106 Atl. 574(1919).
7. Walker v. Man, 253 N.Y. Supp. 458(1931): Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa.
226, 133 Atl. 232(1926). These cases contain excellent collections of early
authorities on this point.
8. 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1932) 143,
§ 5432.
9. For an excellent discussion of the early statutes and their obscurity,
see Comment (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 870.
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differs among the various state statutes.10 It is well settled, how-
ever, that mere errors of judgment will not impose liability on
the directors."
The Louisiana Corporation Act of 1928 provides that corpo-
rate directors who declare illegal dividends will be liable if they
did so "knowingly, or without exercising that diligence, care and
skill which ordinarily prudent men in like positions would exer-
cise under similar conditions."'1 2 Although no Louisiana cases
have directly applied this provision of the act, related decisions
make it apparent that Louisiana courts would not hesitate to
apply the clear meaning of the statute when the factual situation
is presented. 3
The Louisiana Corporation Act gives the cause of action
against the directors to the creditors alone, and not the corpora-
tion. In this respect the Louisiana Corporation Act differs from
the Uniform Business Corporation Act of 1928, in that the latter
provides that the corporation shall have a cause of action against
the directors in case of illegal dividends.'4 The variation made
by the Louisiana act in this regard is indeed a simplification of
the process necessary for a creditor's recovery under the Uniform
Act. The directors of a corporation, particularly a small corpora-
tion, would not be likely to institute an action against themselves
on behalf of the corporation, and thus the creditors to obtain
relief under the Uniform Act might be forced to resort to the du-
plicitous action of suing the corporation and then levying on the
corporate cause of action against the directors. The Louisiana act
abrogates the necessity of these extra legal steps by directly pro-
viding a cause of action for the creditors. 5
The placing of the cause of action only in the creditors, how-
ever, involves a significant limitation. The amount of the illegal
dividend that may be recovered from the directors must be meas-
ured by the amount of the creditors' claims. This sum may be
10. See Comment (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 870, 875.
11. Speigel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. (2d) 895,
904(1937).
12. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 27(I) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1107(I)].
13. Fudickar v. Inabnet, 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745(1933): Stock v. E. A.
Fabacher, Inc., 185 So. 48 (La. App. 1938); Chelsea Sales Corporation v. A.
Jacobs Co., Inc., 193 So. 402 (La. App. 1940). In the Chelsea Sales Corpora-
tion case the plaintiff-creditor was seeking to invoke Section 27(I) of the
Louisiana Corporation Act. The court found that the defendant-directors
had properly distributed certain assets to pay debts including past-due
salaries. Thus the court could not find that the directors were "negligent"
and thereby make them liable to the creditors.
14. 9 U.L.A., Model Business Corporation Act (1928) § 25(I).
15. Cook, Principles of Corporation Law (1925) 314.
1949]
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only a small fraction of the improper dividend. As the statute does
not provide for a corporate cause of action, the entire wrong per-
petrated against the corporation by the directors is not rectified.16
The main provisions of statutes of some other states are note-
worthy at this point. The Minnesota statute, almost identical with
the Uniform Business Corporation Act, places the cause of action
against the directors in the corporation alone. 17 The recently re-
vised California Civil Code provides that the creditors may bring
a direct action against the directors for illegal dividends, if they
were creditors prior to the declaration of the dividend. 8 It should
be noted that this statute is similar to the provisions of the Lou-
isiana act in granting direct action to the creditors, but differs in
that the Louisiana act does not mention that the creditor must
have extended credit before the declaration of the dividend." The
Delaware and New York statutes combine the benefits of the
Uniform Business Corporation Act and the Louisiana Corpora-
tion Act by providing for a cause of action in either the corpora-
tion or the creditors.20 This type of statute has been highly com-
mended by some writers as the better form to facilitate recovery
of illegal dividends from guilty directors.2'
In brief summary, the Louisiana Corporation Act is explicit
in providing for a direct action by creditors against directors in
the event of illegal dividends. The salient limitation of the Lou-
isiana act, however, is that recovery by the creditors alone might
be for a far less sum than the loss caused by the directors' breach
of their fiduciary duty in declaring those dividends. An amend-
ment to Subdivisions 1 of Section 27 of the Corporation Act,
placing the cause of action against the directors in either the
corporation or the creditors would eliminate this limitation, and
provide for a full recovery from those who by their improper
conduct have depleted the corporate structure to the detriment
of both the corporation and its creditors.
22
16. Ballantine, Corporations (1946) 595, § 254.
17. Minn. Stats. Ann. (1945) § 301.23.
18. Calif. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1947) §§ 824, 825, 826.
19. Where the statute merely makes the directors liable to the "credi-
tors," the general rules seem to be that prior and subsequent may recover
alike. The statutory scheme is set up apparently for the benefit of creditors,
present and future. Stoltz v. Scott, 23 Idaho 104, 129 Pac. 340(1912); Brena-
man v. Whitehouse 85 Wash. 355, 148 Pac. 24(1915); Hodde v. Nobbe, 204
Mo. App. 109, 221 S. W. 130(1920).
20. Del. Rev. Code(1935) c. 65, § 2067, as amended by Del. Laws(1937)
c. 130; New York Stock Corporation Law of 1923, § 58.
21. Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928(1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 597, 624.
22. Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65, § 2067, as amended by Del. Laws (1937)
c. 130; New York Stock Corporation Law of 1923, § 58.
[VOL. X
COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS
The liability of shareholders who have received illegal divi-
dends presents an even more complicated problem. The earliest
form of recovery from shareholders was instituted by creditors
in what was called a "creditor's bill." When a corporate creditor
had a judgment against the corporation returned unsatisfied, he
could institute an action in equity against the stockholders on
behalf of himself and all other creditors who chose to join him. 23
Emphasis was placed, however, on the fact that the creditor was
"merely enforcing the right which the corporation had, and the
relief granted must be measured by that right. '24 Even with the
appearance of statutes making the directors liable for these il-
legal dividends, courts still recognized a creditor's right of action
against the stockholders.25
At an early date the courts, in imposing liability on the share-
holders, embarked on one of two main avenues of judicial doc-
trine. The first of these was the "trust fund" doctrine. In the
earlier decisions this doctrine appeared to be the panacea of all
corporate problems and was frequently used in obtaining equit-
able relief for creditors who sought to recover illegal dividends
from the shareholders. 26 The essence of the "trust fund" doctrine
was that the assets of the corporation were held in trust for the
creditors, and second for the shareholders. When any dividend
was declared which reduced this capital or "trust fund," the credi-
tors found immediate basis for their action. Under this doctrine
the good faith of the stockholder who received the dividend
and the solvency of the corporation had nothing to do with the
creditor's right of recovery.27 The clarity and rigidity of this rule
was short lived. The Supreme Court of the United States dealt
the earliest and heaviest blow to the creditor's right to recover
under the "trust fund" theory in the celebrated case of McDonald
v. Williams.28 In that case the receiver 'of a national bank was
seeking to recover illegal dividends, and the court refused recov-
ery on the ground that the corporation was solvent at the time
23. Cook, Principles of Corporation Law (1925) 312.
24. Gager v. Paul, 111 Wis. 638, 87 N.W. 875(1901); Detroit Trust Co. v.
Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N.W. 882(1913). In both these cases the cor-
porati6n had a cause of action provided by statute. It would seem that
this is of the essence before creditor action can be contemplated through a
creditor's bill.
25. Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N. E. 314 (1929).
26. See Barrows, The Equitable Liability of Stockholders: The Grounds
Upon Which It Rests (1903) 13 Yale L. J. 66.
27. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Eddy, 138 Mich. 403, 409, 101 N.W.
578, 581(1904).
28. 174 U.S. 397, 19 S.Ct. 743, 43 L. Ed. 1022 (1899).
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of the declaration of the dividend, and that the stockholder re-
ceived the dividend in good faith and without notice of its il-
legality. This decision was supported later by Bartlett v. Smith29
where the court went to great lengths to point out that if the
corporation remained solvent upon paying the dividend, and the
shareholder was in good faith in receiving that dividend, it would
be totally impracticable to seek to hold this shareholder liable
long after the dividend had been paid.30 A recent Iowa case re-
fused recovery by the creditor on the theory that since the cor-
poration was not insolvent at the time of payment of the divi-
dend it was of no moment that later insolvency resulted.3 1 These
and similar decisions have virtually erased the true theory of
the "trust fund" doctrine.
The other approach to the creditor's recovery in proceedings
against shareholders has been the so-called "fraud" theory.3 2
Under this theory the creditor can recover only if his claim has
arisen prior to the payment of the dividend. 33 Although the ma-
jority of cases support this view, there are strong decisions to the
contrary. One case has held that the very payment of illegal divi-
dends defrauded existing and subsequent creditors alike;3 4 an-
other that the payment constituted a "constructive fraud" as per-
sons who extended credit after the payment of an illegal dividend
had just reason to assume that the capital 9tructure had not pre-
viouslybeen impaired.3 5 General rules are difficult to glean from
this array of conflicting jurisprudence. A review and rationaliza-
29. 162 Md. 478, 160 Atl. 440 (1932).
30. 162 Md. 478, 482, 160 Atl. 440, 441 (1932). The court's reasoning is
noteworthy at this point, in that this language has become the thesis of
later decisions. It has also been adopted by some students of corporation
law as the only just picture of the shareholders' position in the case of illegal
dividends. The court said: "In this situation we are disposed to follow the
Federal decisions as being more in accord with modern conditions and
with the realities of life. In these days stocks of corporations are so widely
held that it would be practically impossible for stockholders generally to
know whether or not each semi-annual dividend paid in regular course was
earned. Whatever their position may be theoretically, practically they are
in no better position than creditors to know the condition of the company,
and it would be an unfair and unreasonable burden to require them to pay
back, years after they have been spent, dividends received in good faith
from a solvent corporation in regular course of business."
31. Bates v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 1128, 270 N.W. 867, 109 A.L. R. 1371'(1937).
32. Johnson v. Canfleld-Swigart Co., 292 Ill. 101, 126 N.E. 608(1920).
33. Wood v. National City Bank, 24 F.(2d) 661 (C.C.A. 2d, 1928); Rat-
cliff v. Clendenin, 232 Fed. 61 (C.C.A. 8th, 1916).
34. Fricke v. Angemeier, 101 N.E. 329 (Ind. App. 1913).
35. Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N.W. 228 (1917). Held that sub-
sequent creditors could recover as they had trusted the corporation in
ignorance that its capital had been impaired. The basis of the action was
not actual fraud, but "constructive fraud" and the good faith of the stock-
holder did not prevent recovery.
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tion of the "trust fund" and "fraud" doctrines would in itself be
a herculean task. Suffice it to say that in the absence of definite
legislative guidance in such cases, the limitation of these judicial-
ly developed theories is the ingenuity of the bench itself."
It is now pertinent to consider in -detail certain provisions of
the Louisiana Corporation Act. Subdivision II of Section 27 pro-
vides:
"II. Every shareholder who received any such dividend or
such distribution or return of assets shall in the following
instances be individually liable to the corporation in an
amount equal to the amount so received by him:
(a) when no director is liable to a creditor as provided
in subdivision I of this section; or
(b) to the extent that a creditor is unable to obtain satis-
faction after judgments recovered against directors
upon the liability imposed by subdivision I of this
section."
The good faith of the shareholder in receiving the dividend
and the solvency of the corporation are immaterial. The only
qualifications to shareholder's liability are those set out in the
statute itself-the non-liability or the insolvency of the directors.
This provision of the act, however, gives the cause of action solely
to the corporation, and then states that the liability attaches only
in case of non-liability or the insolvency of the directors. An
anomalous situation is at once presented by the very text of the
statute. It is indeed peculiar that the corporate cause of action
against the shareholders must be predicated upon the failure of
the creditors' cause of action against the directors, yet the cause
of action asserted exists only in favor of the corporation. The only
practical solution for the corporation is to promote a friendly
creditors' action against the directors, thus giving the corporation
statutory basis for proceeding against the shareholders.
Since the statute does not mention creditors' rights against
the shareholders, the next question that arises is: In Louisiana,
what recourse, if any, does a creditor have against the share-
holders? Reference to the jurisprudence is helpful at this point.
In the case of Fudickar v. Inabnet3T the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana allowed the creditors to recover directly against the share-
36. In 1843 a Kentucky court sought to justify a creditor's recovery
against the shareholders by utilizing the law of mistake. For an excellent
discussion of the folly of this approach to the problem, see Note(1933) 33
Col. L. Rev. 481, 486.
37. 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933).
1949]
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holders who had received distribution of assets in anticipation
of liquidation. The court first noted that under Section 27 of the
Louisiana Corporation Act the shareholders' liability runs in
favor of the corporation itself. This fact was of no importance,
because the corporation had ceased to exist, and no receiver was
available to act on behalf of the corporation. In allowing recovery
by the creditors, the court cited Section 27 of the Louisiana Cor-
poration Act, but practiced a bit of judicial hedging by further
stating: "We think the several provisions of Act No. 250 of 1928
[Louisiana Corporation Act] are broad enough to cover a case of
this kind. But, if we are wrong in this, we think plaintiff is en-
titled to a remedy under the equity powers conferred upon the
courts by the state by Article 21 of the Civil Code, particularly
in view of Article 3183 which declares 'The property of the debtor
is the common pledge of his creditors.'" In conclusion the court
referred to an earlier case, Derbes v. Till,38 where under similar
circumstances the court allowed the creditors direct recovery
against the shareholders. In the Derbes case the corporation was
no longer in existence, and the counsel for the creditors was quite
frank in stating in his brief that he knew of no statutory provi-
sion in Louisiana which provided for a direct creditors' action
against the shareholders. His entire prayer for relief was based
on Articles 21 and 3183 of the Civil Code. Judge Janvier
agreed that it would be most inequitable to allow a shareholder
to benefit at the expense of a creditor, but in allowing the credi-
tors to recover directly against the shareholders he made it very
clear that only when the corporation has ceased to exist and is
not represented by a receiver or liquidator will such direct action
lie. Two other Louisiana cases substantiate these views. 39
The propriety of placing the cause of action against the share-
holders in the corporation is not here questioned. It is certainly
true that the corporation may recover the entire illegal dividend,
whereas a creditor might recover only what is owed to him. How-
ever, where lies the creditors' remedy in case the corporation is
in existence and is controlled by the shareholders who have re-
ceived the improper dividends? It is very unlikely that these
shareholders would institute corporate action against themselves
in order to protect the capital structure for the benefit of the
creditors. If the creditors are unable to recover from the directors,
as provided by Subdivision I of Section 27 of the Louisiana Cor-
38. 128 So. 196(La. App. 1930).
39. Stock v. Fabacher, Inc., 185 So. 48(La. App. 1938); New Orleans Gas
Light Co. v. Bennett, 6 La. Ann. 456 (1851).
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poration Act, what is their next step in protecting their invest-
ment? After a diligent search no case has been found which pre-
sents this problem. It has been suggested by one writer that
the Louisiana courts would allow a suit in the nature of a credi-
tor's bill against the shareholders, thus allowing the creditor to
levy on the corporate cause of action against the shareholders.
40
In the Derbes case, Judge Janvier stated that if there still exists
a receiver or liquidator who can bring the necessary suit, the
creditor should "either by appropriate action, force the receiver
or liquidator to act, or in the alternative, should bring the suit
himself, not for his sole individual benefit, but on behalf of the
whole estate. ' ' 41 It must be remembered that he is speaking of a
corporation which is in the hands of a receiver or a liquidator.
A creditor could argue by analogy to the above opinion that he
should be allowed to sue on behalf of an existing corporation
when that corporation refused to bring the proper action against
the shareholders. This is at best an argument and its acceptance
in future litigation is conjectural. There exists the further possi-
bility that Louisiana courts might adopt either the "trust fund"
or "fraud" doctrine plus or minus the many modifications at-
tached to both. There is no way of ascertaining what other equit-
able doctrines might be borrowed from the mass of litigation
that has flooded other jurisdictions on the same questions.
It is very unfortunate that the basic relationships of creditor
and shareholder, as contemplated by the corporate form of busi-
ness, should be left to flounder in this myriad of conflicting doc-
trine.42 In reality both the shareholder and the creditor are in-
vestors in the corporation. The creditor expects the return on
his investment ahead of the shareholder. The capital structure
of the corporation is the security for his investment. The share-
holder, on the other hand, is led to expect return on his invest-
ment only after primary obligations of the corporation have been
met and net profits are available for dividend payments. The
various classes of participating shares exemplify the choice given
to the shareholder to participate at different levels of net profit.
No share of stock on its face purports to prime the claims of
creditors. The Louisiana Corporation Act establishes with no un-
40. Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928 (1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 597, 625.
41. 128 So. 196, 198 (La. App. 1930).
42. For a discussion of the various applications of equitable doctrines
In suits against shareholders, and the failure of most courts to recognize
the basic relationship of a stockholder and creditors to the corporation, see
Note (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 481.
19491
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certainty that dividends shall not be paid except from surplus.43
It cannot be denied that such statutory policy of dividend restric-
tion is intended primarily for protection of creditors.
There is no need for future Louisiana litigation to shoot judicial
rapids experienced in other states, replete with confusing and
conflicting theories of shareholders' liability. Preventive legisla-
tion is desirable. An amendment to Subdivision II of Section 27
of the Louisiana Corporation Act, allowing the creditors, in ad-
dition to the corporation, a direct action against shareholders to
recover illegal dividends, regardless of the good faith of the
shareholder, solvency of the corporation, or position of the credi-
tor's claim in relation to the declaration of the dividend, would
insure the basic relationships of both creditors and shareholders
and uphold the clear statutory policy of dividend restrictions.
44
A very brief prescriptive period for this action would relieve the
shareholder of a long period of uncertainty, which has been the
touchstone of so many decisions allowing the good faith stock-
holder to retain a clearly illegal dividend.
45
Subdivision III of Section 27 of the Louisiana Corporation
Act provides that directors who are held liable "for the sole rea-
son of having acted negligently" shall have a right of action over
against each shareholder for the proportionate amount of the
illegal dividend, distribution, payment or return of assets re-
ceived by the shareholder. This excellent provision in our cor-
poration law has been highly commended as an appropriate
statutory method of reimbursing merely negligent directors who
should not be made to stand this burden for such a minor mis-
feasance.46
WILLIAM F. WILSON, JR.
CORPORATIONS: SHAREHOLDER RATIFICATION OF
DIRECTORS' ACTION
It often happens that the board of directors of a corporation
authorizes an unenforceable transaction. Such transactions are
unenforceable because they are either ultra vires, voidable, or
43. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 26(I) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106(I)].
44. Ballantine, Corporations (1946) 601, § 255. "The true basis of liability
(of the shareholder) is neither the trust fund theory nor a fraudulent con-
veyance theory, but the enforcement of the statutory policy of dividend re-
strictions and the questions of what remedies are practical and just for the
purpose of protecting all parties concerned."
45. See note 30, supra.
46. Briggs, Stockholders' Liability for Unlawful Dividends (1934) 8
Temple L. Q. 145, 184.
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